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GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD CONSEQUENCES: HOW
CONGRESS’S EFFORTS TO ERADICATE HIV/AIDS
STIFLE THE SPEECH OF HUMANITARIAN
ORGANIZATIONS
Garima Malhotra+
The HIV/AIDS epidemic affects millions of lives worldwide. In 2009,
approximately 1.8 million people lost their lives to the disease.1 That same
year, an estimated 2.6 million people became infected with the debilitating
illness, which raised the total number of people living with the illness to an
astronomical 33.3 million.2 Children carry an inordinate share of this burden;
approximately 2.5 million children under the age of fifteen suffer from
HIV/AIDS, and an estimated 16 million children have been orphaned by
infected parents.3 These devastating numbers prompted the United States to
take action.
In his 2003 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush asked
Congress to commit $15 billion to “turn the tide against AIDS,” and noted that
“history [has seldom] offered a greater opportunity to do so much for so
many.”4 Congress responded by enacting the United States Leadership
Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act),
which pledged billions of dollars to assist nonprofit organizations and foreign
governments in the fight against these infectious diseases.5 This enormous
financial commitment under the Leadership Act has tremendous power to
generate positive global change; however, this well-meaning effort has turned
+

J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2008, Cornell University. The author would like to thank her parents, brother, and sister-inlaw for their prayer, support, and unconditional love, Professors Marshall Breger and Sarah
Duggin for their guidance and expertise, and the staff of the Catholic University Law Review for
their thoughtful edits. The author is also eternally grateful to her cousins, Neal and Sonia, for
their mentorship and love. And, thank you, Sameer, for making every day special and for
providing me with indispensable perspective.
1. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Global Report: UNAIDS
Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2010, at 19 (2010), available at http://www.unaids.org
/globalreport/documents/20101123_GlobalReport_em.pdf.
2. Id. at 21 tbl.2.2, 23.
3. Id. at 23, 24 fig.2.5, 112.
4. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS
82, 85 (Jan. 28, 2003).
5. Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7601 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010)). In 2008, the Act’s funding was extended by $48 billion to be distributed over a five-year
period. The Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-293, § 401(a), 122 Stat.
2918, 2966.
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into a constitutional battleground.6 Nonprofit organizations tasked with
conducting HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs around the world
have filed suit, arguing that the Leadership Act’s funding provision violates
their First Amendment right to free speech.7
The funding provision only permits disbursement of federal funds to
organizations that have “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution.”8 Congress
included this provision pursuant to its conditional spending power, which gives
Congress the authority to condition receipt of federal grants.9 However, the
extent to which Congress can require federal grant recipients to surrender
otherwise guaranteed constitutional rights is unclear.10 The uncertain scope of
Congress’s spending power has generated the Leadership Act controversy.
The Leadership Act promotes HIV/AIDS prevention and preventative
intervention education, treatment, and procurement and distribution of
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals.11 Although a national policy against prostitution
is critically important, tying HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention funds to the
promotion of this policy violates the First Amendment and severely
undermines global health efforts.12 Courts disagree on the constitutionality of
the funding provision, section 7631(f), also known as the Policy

6. See infra Part I.C.
7. See, e.g., Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l v. U.S. Agency of Int’l Dev. (AOSI IV), 651
F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the provision violates the First Amendment by
requiring organizations to advance the government’s position), reh’g en banc denied, No. 084917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (DKT II), 477 F.3d
758, 759–61 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the nonprofit organization’s argument that the provision
forces it to perpetuate a disagreeable policy that alienates high-risk populations, such as sex
workers).
8. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006). Although the provision also prohibits assistance to
organizations that do not oppose sex trafficking explicitly, this Comment focuses only on the
requirement that organizations explicitly oppose prostitution. See id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)
(“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds . . . ‘to further broad policy
objectives by . . . [requiring] compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative
directives.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (plurality opinion))).
10. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 205 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he extent
to which the Government may attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to the receipt of a
public benefit—implicates a troubled area of our jurisprudence in which a court ought not
entangle itself unnecessarily.”); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1121 (1987) (noting that the Supreme Court generally
approaches Conditional Spending Clause cases on a narrow “case by case” basis); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (1989) (“[T]he doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is riven with inconsistencies.”).
11. Pub. L. No. 108-25, § 301(a)(2), 117 Stat. 711, 728 (2003) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2151b-2).
12. See infra Part II (analyzing First Amendment concerns with the anti-prostitution policy
requirement); infra Part III (discussing U.S. policy concerns).
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Requirement.13 The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the provision in 2007.14 The Second Circuit recently disagreed, and
held that the provision unconstitutionally conditioned receipt of federal grant
money by compelling recipient organizations to oppose prostitution, thereby
violating the First Amendment.15
This Comment explores the constitutionality of section 7631(f) of the
Leadership Act. Part I examines foundational Supreme Court jurisprudence
delineating Congress’s authority to restrict or compel speech as a condition of
government spending. Next, this Comment turns to the current split between
the Second and D.C. Circuits, highlighting substantive differences in the two
opinions. Then, through an analysis of current Spending Clause jurisprudence,
Part II argues that the Second Circuit correctly determined that the Policy
Requirement violates the First Amendment and is an unconstitutional condition
placed on federal grant money. Finally, this Comment explores various
alternatives that would allow Congress to advance its policy objectives without
violating the First Amendment and the Spending Clause. This Comment
ultimately concludes that the best solution would restrict organizations from
spending federal funds on activities related to legalizing prostitution, but
permit organizations to regulate the process through which they allocate their
money.
I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL-CONDITIONS JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Spending Clause and the Birth of the Unconstitutional-Conditions
Doctrine
The Spending Clause grants Congress “[p]ower [t]o lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”16 Congress may use its
Spending Clause power broadly to benefit the “general welfare.”17 However,
13. Compare DKT II, 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2007), with AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 223
(2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012).
14. DKT II, 477 F.3d at 764.
15. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 223–24.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
17. Id.; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). Justice Owen Roberts, writing for
the Court in United States v. Butler, endorsed the broad Hamiltonian view that the Spending
Clause gives Congress “a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the
requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States.”
Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66. Although Justice Roberts seemingly endorsed the Hamiltonian theory,
his holding arguably applied a much narrower version of the Spending Clause. ALPHEUS
THOMAS MASON & DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES 281 (16th ed. 2012).
Two years after Butler, the Court endorsed a the generous definition of the “general
welfare,” holding that Congress has discretion to determine whether spending advances the
general welfare. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); see also MASON &
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problems may arise when Congress “attach[es] strings to its expenditures” by
compelling recipients to engage in specific conduct in order to receive
government funding.18 When the government compels federal subsidy or grant
recipients to act in a manner that invokes certain constitutional rights, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is implicated.19 Under the doctrine, if
the government chooses to grant a benefit, it may not do so in a manner that
requires recipients to surrender certain constitutional protections.20 In an early
case, Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, the Supreme Court
articulated this proposition and expressed grave concern that such conditions
would allow the government to eviscerate the rights and guarantees embodied
in the Constitution. 21

STEPHENSON, supra, at 281. Some scholars argue that Congress’s broad authority under the
Spending Clause is unfounded. See John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General
Welfare Clause, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV. 63 (2001) (arguing that “general welfare” is meant as a
limitation to congressional spending); Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the
Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 55 (2003) (“[T]he
General Welfare Clause was an unqualified denial of spending authority. It did not add to federal
powers; it subtracted from them.”).
Congress’s spending power, however, does have some limitations. See South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) (“[O]ther constitutional provisions may provide an independent
bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.”). For example, federal spending affecting religious
organizations may violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Role of
the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1839 &
n.121 (2004) (discussing Establishment Clause-based challenges to the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, which Congress enacted to prevent religious discrimination by
effectively “limiting religious congregations’ ability to build or expand places of worship”).
18. Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1104 (explaining that an “[i]f you don’t like the conditions,
don’t take the money,” argument must fail, given public and private entities’ dependence on
federal grants).
19. Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1988) (“The problem of unconstitutional conditions
arises whenever a government seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining bargained-for
consent of the party whose conduct is to be restricted.”); Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1421–22
(describing two prerequisites necessary to invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine: “the
conditioned government benefit on the one hand and the affected constitutional right on the other
hand”).
20. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[T]his Court has made clear that even
though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely.”); Epstein, supra note 19, at 6–7 (“[E]ven if a state has
absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to
conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the waiver of constitutional rights.”).
21. 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926); see also Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (“For if the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his
exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’” (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958))).
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B. Inconsistent First Amendment Protections Under the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine
More than a half-century of Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates the
Court’s willingness to insulate First Amendment speech rights from
encroachment under the auspices of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.22
In the last few decades, however, the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine
to First Amendment cases in a piecemeal fashion, creating inconsistencies and
numerous exceptions.23 This has made it increasingly challenging for lower
courts to apply existing precedent when determining whether government
conditions impinge on First Amendments rights.
1. Denial-of-Subsidies Cases
In some cases, the Supreme Court has upheld conditional grants as
constitutional even when they compel grant recipients to forgo their First
Amendment rights. In these cases, however, the grant conditions merely
denied a subsidy and did not impose an impermissible condition or penalty.24
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation, the Court declined to apply strict
scrutiny and upheld the denial of tax benefits to not-for-profit organizations.25
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to
Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR) because a large majority

22. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding that states may not require
motorists to display an ideological message on their license plates); Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518
(explaining that states may not deny tax exemptions to veterans who refuse to submit to an oath
disproving of forcible government overthrow); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) (holding that states cannot compel public school children to recite the pledge of
allegiance). The government may, however, use stipulations that arguably infringe on other
constitutionally protected rights. See Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the government may lawfully require airline passengers to undergo reasonable
security screening that might otherwise implicate their Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizures).
23. See supra note 10.
24. See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1439 (noting the “penalty/nonsubsidy distinction” and
explaining that “‘[p]enalties’ coerce; ‘nonsubsidies’ do not”).
25. 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (holding that Congress is not required to fund TWR’s
lobbying). Although Taxation with Representation focuses on tax benefits rather than conditional
grants, the Court clearly applies a general Spending Clause analysis. See id. at 540; see also
Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1123 (“The Court has also occasionally appeared to treat tax benefits
as constitutionally equivalent to spending.” (footnote omitted)).
The Court’s refusal to apply a strict-scrutiny analysis reflects its view that the
government is not required to subsidize the exercise of First Amendment rights. Taxation with
Representation, 461 U.S. at 549 (“[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 982 (4th ed. 2011). But see
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991) (applying strict scrutiny to find that the Title X
provision at issue was narrowly tailored).
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of its activities involved lobbying, which is not permitted under the section.26
TWR argued that Congress’s decision to deny tax-exempt status because of its
lobbying activities violated its First Amendment right to free speech.27 The
Court disagreed with TWR, and held that Congress can choose what conduct to
fund.28 In a concurring opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun conceded that
lobbying restrictions placed on § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status violated TWR’s
freedom of speech, but that any “constitutional defect” was remedied by
another statutory provision that allowed the organization to both receive a tax
exemption and lobby through an affiliate organization.29
The Supreme Court similarly declined to strike down a regulation
prohibiting federal funding recipients from providing certain family planning
methods in the influential case Rust v. Sullivan.30 The challenged regulation,
section 1008 of the Public Health Services Act, states that “[n]one of the funds
appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is
a method of family planning.”31 The regulations promulgated to implement
section 1008 prohibit Title X projects from participating in acts that
“encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family
The
planning”—including providing referrals to abortion providers.32
regulations also require Title X projects to maintain financial and physical
independence from abortion-related services.33
26. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 543–44 (noting that although TWR had a
§ 501(c)(4) entity through which it could lobby, it brought suit to use tax-deductible funds, which
it received only through its § 501(c)(3) entity); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
27. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 545. TWR analogized its case to Speiser v.
Randall, in which the Court held unconstitutional a state law requiring parties seeking a
property-tax exemption to advocate against the forcible overthrow of the government. Id.;
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 517–19. The Court rejected the analogy and noted that, unlike the state law
in Speiser, § 501(c)(3) does not deny TWR a right or benefit; rather, it prevents Congress from
allocating public funds to lobbying. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 545.
28. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 546 (“Congress has not infringed any First
Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen not
to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”).
29. Id. at 552–53 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Justice Blackmun’s view, the distinction
between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) allowed Congress to consciously limit tax benefits to
non-lobbying activities only, without prohibiting organizations from lobbying with private funds.
Id. at 553. Justice Blackmun also warned that if Congress attempted to limit the organization’s
control of its lobbying affiliate, “the First Amendment problems would be insurmountable.” Id.
30. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196–98.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2006).
32. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1991). Although federal funds account for approximately half of
a Title X program’s budget, section 1008 applies to the whole program. David Cole, Beyond
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 684 (1992).
33. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9. Recipients of Title X funds argued that the “impermissibly
burden[some]” regulation, mandating physical and financial separation, is inconsistent with the
plain language of Title X. Rust, 500 U.S. at 187–88. The Court replied that “if one thing is clear
from the legislation history, it is that Congress intended that Title X funds be kept separate and
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The recipients claimed that the provision violated the First Amendment by
regulating their speech on abortion advocacy as a condition for receiving
government funding.34 The Court analogized the case to Taxation with
Representation, and found that the government’s choice not to fund abortionrelated activities did not violate the First Amendment.35 In particular, the
Court found that the regulation prohibiting counseling on abortion or referring
to abortion providers was not impermissible viewpoint discrimination, but
rather “a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech,
which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded.”36 The
Court concluded that these provisions were not unconstitutional because they
merely required recipients to “keep such [abortion-related] activities separate
and distinct from Title X activities.”37 The Court reasoned that this was a
permissible restriction based on the government’s determination of the
statute’s purpose and what activities it chose to fund.38 Though the Rust Court
did not explicitly characterize it as such, this doctrine later became known as
the government speech doctrine.39

distinct from abortion-related activities.” Id. at 190. For a discussion on the effect of such
regulations on organizations, see infra Part III.B–C.
34. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192 (arguing that the Act imposed “viewpoint-discriminatory
conditions on government subsidies” by only funding programs that promoted the government’s
agenda).
35. Id. at 197–98; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1977) (holding that the
government may choose not to subsidize abortion with public funds). Justice Blackmun, who
concurred in Taxation with Representation, stated in dissent:
Until today, the Court never has upheld viewpoint-based suppression of speech simply
because that suppression was a condition upon the acceptance of public funds.
Whatever may be the Government’s power to condition the receipt of its largess upon
the relinquishment of constitutional rights, it surely does not extend to a condition that
suppresses the recipient’s cherished freedom of speech based solely upon the content or
viewpoint of that speech.
Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958)); see
also Cole, supra note 32, at 684–85 (“[I]n at least one respect [Rust] was faithful to precedent: it
reflects all the ambivalence and confusion that has long characterized the Supreme Court’s
adjudication . . . .”).
36. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194–95.
37. Id. at 196 (distinguishing Title X projects from grantees by explaining that “the
Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds
be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized”). In a detailed analysis of the Rust
opinion, Associate Professor David Cole noted that Rust’s “broad dicta” suggests that a restriction
may still be unconstitutional if it is: (1) “aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,” (2)
“‘singl[es] out a disfavored group,’” and (3) is “content- or viewpoint-based in forums dedicated .
. . to expressive activities.” Cole, supra note 32, at 693.
38. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
39. See infra note 125.
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2. Unconstitutional-Conditions Cases
In other cases, the Court has invalidated provisions that condition grant
funding by restricting First Amendment rights.40 Reconciling these cases with
Taxation with Representation and Rust proves difficult. In FCC v. League of
Women Voters of California, the Court held unconstitutional section 399 of the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which prohibited noncommercial
broadcasting stations receiving federal grant money from “editorializing.”41
The Court found that the ban was not narrowly tailored to achieve its policy
objective,42 and held that the blanket restriction impermissibly prevented
broadcasting stations from editorializing—even through use of private funds.43
Although the Court found that section 399 was an impermissible use of the
government’s Spending Clause power, it noted that if Congress allowed
stations to create two separate entities—one prohibited from editorializing,
which would receive government funding, and another that could editorialize
but would not benefit from public funds—the Act could be permissible.44
More recently, the Supreme Court invalidated a provision that prohibited
federally funded legal-service providers from representing clients in challenges
to existing welfare law.45 The Court, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,
found that this provision violated the First Amendment rights of legal-service
funding recipients by creating a limited forum that regulated how legal-service
providers may advocate on their client’s behalf.46 Although not explicitly
invoking the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court found that the
funding restrictions impermissibly controlled the speech of private actors47 and
40. See infra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
41. 468 U.S. 364, 395 (1984); see Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81
Stat. 365, 368 (1967).
42. Section 399 was intended to appease concerns that government funding could turn
noncommercial broadcast stations into “propaganda organs for the government,” or lead viewers
to believe the editorials were government opinions. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 372,
395. The Court held that section 399 was both under- and over-inclusive and was not sufficiently
tailored to achieve its stated goals. Id. at 392–94. Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief
Justice Warren Burger and Justice Byron White, dissented. Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Act was a legitimate exercise of Congress’s spending power).
43. Id. at 395–96, 400 (majority opinion) (noting that only one percent of the station’s
income came from the government grant).
44. Id. at 400.
45. See generally Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) is a D.C. nonprofit created by Congress to provide access to legal assistance
by distributing federal funds to eligible providers. See id. at 536. Both LSC and the government
found that “the restriction prevents an attorney from arguing to a court that a state statute conflicts
with a federal statute or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application is
violative of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 537.
46. Id. at 544–46. The Court noted that controlling how an LSC attorney may advocate on
behalf of his or her client “threatens severe impairment of the judicial function.” Id. at 546.
47. Id. at 542; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834
(1995) (“It does not follow . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University
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amounted to viewpoint-based discrimination because, unlike in Rust, the
“program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a
governmental message.”48 Thus, the Court held that although Congress may
choose not to fund all forms of legal representation, it may not “define the
scope of the litigation it funds to exclude certain vital theories and ideas.”49
3. Viewpoint-Based Restrictions
Viewpoint-based speech restrictions and their relation to the government
speech doctrine have attracted the Court’s attention on various occasions. In
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, the Court held
unconstitutional a University of Virginia guideline that denied organizational
funding to groups that expressed religious views.50 The Court noted the blurry
distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination, but qualified the
guidelines as viewpoint discrimination because the University disfavored
student journalistic efforts with religious viewpoints, rather than excluding
religion as a subject matter altogether.51 The Court distinguished this case
from Rust, noting that although the University may regulate the content of
speech when it enlists private actors to convey its message as in Rust, it may
not discriminate against private entities it subsidizes because of the entity’s
viewpoint.52 Thus, the Court found that because the purpose of the
University’s funding regulation was not intended to convey a University
message, the funding restriction was unconstitutional.53

does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”). But cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum of Academic
& Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006) (holding that government funding restrictions
that require universities to allow military recruiters onto their campuses was constitutional
because the funding restriction did not discriminate based on viewpoint, as no one was required to
endorse a “Government-mandated pledge” and everyone was still allowed to voice their
disagreement with the government viewpoint).
48. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548.
49. Id. at 541.
50. 515 U.S. 819, 836–37 (1995).
51. Id. at 830–31.
52. Id. at 832–34. The Court has also invalidated viewpoint-based conditions when speech
is restricted in forums that are especially designed to promote free speech. See Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601–03 (1967) (finding a restriction on faculty speech at a public
university to be unconstitutional); cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108, 116 (1991) (invalidating a state law requiring a criminal to remit
money earned by publishing a book describing his crimes to the state in order to compensate
victims). Such viewpoint-based restrictions “raise[] the specter that the government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502
U.S. at 116 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991)).
53. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834–35.
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C. The Leadership Act: Enactment, Judicial Review, and Controversy
1. The Purpose, History, and Original Implementation of the Leadership
Act and its Policy Requirement
In 2003, the 108th Congress enacted the Leadership Act to “authorize[] a
multisectoral approach to fighting AIDS, and endorse[] education, research,
prevention, treatment and care of those infected with HIV and those
individuals living with AIDS.”54 This historic legislation allocated $15 billion
to address both the humanitarian health crisis and a growing international
security crisis55 “that demand[ed] a global humanitarian response with the
United States in the lead.”56
Representative Christopher Smith introduced the Policy Requirement as an
amendment to the Leadership Act in the House Committee on International
Relations.57 The amendment became part of the Leadership Act, and states
that “[n]o funds made available to carry out this chapter . . . may be used to
provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”58 A close reading of the
legislative history reveals that Representative Smith introduced the Policy
Requirement with the primary purpose of eradicating human trafficking and
prostitution.59 In his statements before the Committee, Representative Smith
54. H.R. REP. NO. 108-60, at 23 (2005). A similar version of the bill received bipartisan
support in the 107th Congress. Id. at 25. However, the bill was not enacted because the House
and Senate could not reconcile the different versions of the bill despite agreement by both
chambers on “the need for expanded assistance to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic.” Id.
55. Id. at 24 (“The HIV/AIDS pandemic is a crisis that threatens the stability, economy and
democratic institutions of many nations.”). The report also noted that HIV/AIDS threatens to
undermine democracy in Africa, as military personnel in African countries have the highest risk
of contracting HIV/AIDS. Id. at 24–25; see also United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003: Markup Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th
Cong. 77 [hereinafter Leadership Act Markup] (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Int’l Relations).
56. Leadership Act Markup, supra note 55, at 78 (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos, Member,
H. Comm. on Int’l Relations) (“For those of us who have long called for a real commitment of
resources to address the HIV/AIDS crisis, our day has arrived.”). Representative Lantos also
noted three important ways the Act tackles the HIV/AIDS problem: (1) providing funding for
treatment and prevention, (2) allocating resources to organize an international effort, and (3)
establishing strong leadership from government and nonprofit partners committed to “a long-term
campaign to defeat [HIV/AIDS].” Id. at 79.
57. Id. at 148 (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith, Vice Chairman, H. Comm. on Int’l
Relations). At the time the Smith Amendment was introduced, the Committee on International
Relations had already approved another amendment—the Hyde Amendment—that restricted
funds related to prostitution and human trafficking. Id. at 96 (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Int’l Relations).
58. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006).
59. Leadership Act Markup, supra note 55, at 148 (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith,
Vice Chairman, H. Comm. on Int’l Relations). Representative Smith further noted that funding
an “organization that does that kind of thing” supports the oppression of sex slaves. Id. at 149.
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briefly expressed his view that the amendment would help curtail the increase
of HIV/AIDS infections.60 The Committee approved the amendment by a slim
margin, and the Policy Requirement subsequently became part of the
Leadership Act.61
Following the enactment of the Leadership Act, U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) began distributing grants.62 Heeding a
Department of Justice (DOJ) warning, the agency only applied the Policy
Requirement to foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs).63 The DOJ
later withdrew this warning, which prompted USAID to apply the Policy
Requirement to domestic NGOs as well.64 To implement the Act, USAID
issued the Acquisition and Assistance Policy Directive 05-04 (AAPD 05-04) in
June 2005.65 Among other things, AAPD 05-04 required both foreign and
domestic NGOs to comply with a provision entitled Prohibition on the
To garner support for the amendment, Representative Smith highlighted many disturbing facts
regarding the prevalence of human trafficking and prostitution around the world. Id. This
suggests that Representative Smith’s main goal was to organize an effort to end prostitution and
human trafficking, rather than address HIV/AIDS concerns.
60. Id. at 148–49. But see infra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing studies
showing that assistance to prostitutes, in all forms, helps reduce the occurrence of HIV/AIDs).
61. Leadership Act Markup, supra note 55, at 160 (passing with a vote of twenty-four for
the amendment and twenty-two against); see also Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (2003)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7631).
62. OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AAPD 04-04,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCU-LOSIS
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE, LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS
AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 2–3 (2004), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd04_04_original.pdf.
63. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (AOSI I), 430 F. Supp.
2d 222, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 084917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012). An undisclosed memorandum written by the DOJ’s Office of
Legal Counsel questioned the constitutionality of section 7631(f). Laura Abel, Obama
Administration Refuses to Release Bush-Era OLC Opinion Characterizing “Anti-Prostitution
Policy Requirement” as Unconstitutional, HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (Oct. 20, 2009, 8:27 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/63837-obama-administration-refuses-to-releasebush-era-olc-opinion-characterizing-anti-prostitution-policy-requriement-as-unconstitutional-.
The memorandum served as the administration’s impetus for not applying section 7631(f) to
domestic-based NGOs for eighteen months. Id. After the DOJ, the Department of Health and
Human Services, and USAID refused Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to produce
the memo, the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law filed a lawsuit
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking its release. Brennan Ctr.
for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, No. 09 Civ. 8756 (VM), 2011 WL
4001146, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011). Following a FOIA analysis, the court ordered the
agencies to release the memorandum. Id. at *7.
64. AOSI I, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 234–35.
65. OFFICE OF ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE,U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AAPD 05-04,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION
TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 1–2 (2005) [hereinafter AAPD 05-04], available at
http://www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd04_04_original.pdf.
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Promotion or Advocacy of the Legalization or Practice of Prostitution or Sex
Trafficking. The provision required recipients to certify their compliance with
the U.S. government’s policy against prostitution and trafficking.66
2. Questioning the Policy Requirement Through Judicial Review
Following the enactment of the Leadership Act, nonprofit agencies began to
question the constitutionality of the Policy Requirement.67 Various NGOs
brought suit in the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and the
Southern District of New York.68 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit and the Second
Circuit reached different conclusions.69 Their divergent opinions reflect the
tension that permeates the existing precedent on unconstitutional conditions.
a. The D.C. Circuit Upholds the Policy Requirement
i. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Finds Section
7631(f) Unconstitutional
DKT International is a nonprofit family planning organization that conducts
HIV/AIDS prevention work in over a dozen countries.70 As part of this effort,
DKT distributes condoms in Vietnam.71 DKT received USAID funding for
such work as a sub-grantee of Family Health International (FHI).72 During the
summer of 2005, FHI informed DKT that its sub-grantee status required DKT
to certify that it had anti-sex trafficking and anti-prostitution policies.73 When

66. Id. at 5–6. Under AAPD 05-04, grants and agreements were required to include the
following language:
The U.S. Government is opposed to prostitution and related activities, which are
inherently harmful and dehumanizing . . . . Except as noted in the second sentence of
this paragraph, as a condition of entering into this agreement or any subagreement, a
non-governmental
organization
or
public
international
organization
recipient/subrecipient must have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex
trafficking.
Id. at 5. Before receiving USAID funds, each recipient must provide a certification as follows:
“[Recipient’s name] certifies compliance as applicable with the standard provision[] entitled
‘Prohibition on the Promotion or Advocacy of the Legalization or Practice of Prostitution or Sex
Trafficking’ included in the reference agreement.” Id. at 6.
67. See supra note 63.
68. DKT Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (DKT I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2006),
rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007); AOSI I, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 228–30.
69. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 239–40 (affirming preliminary injunctions enjoining USAID from
applying the Policy Requirement to plaintiff NGOs); DKT II, 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(reversing the district court and holding that the Leadership Act does not compel speech in
violation of the First Amendment).
70. HOME, DKT INT’L, http://www.dktinternational.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
71. DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
72. Id. USAID grants funded approximately sixteen percent of the nonprofit’s budget. Id.
73. Id. (noting that FHI refused to remit unused grant money to DKT after their original
grant term expired because a DKT representative refused to certify such a policy).
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DKT refused to sign the certification agreement, FHI cancelled a grant that it
had already agreed to fund.74 DKT explained that it refused to enact such a
policy because it would have “stigmatizing and alienating” effects on sex
workers, thus hampering DKT’s efforts to aid those most vulnerable to
HIV/AIDS.75
Following the grant cancellation, DKT promptly filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia against USAID and USAID
Administrator, Andrew S. Natsios.76 DKT challenged the constitutionality of
the Policy Requirement as applied to DKT and AAPD 05-04’s requirement
that DKT have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution.77
The district court held that Congress exceeded its Spending Clause authority
by placing an unconstitutional condition, in the form of viewpoint-based
restrictions,78 on the receipt of federal funds.79 Critically, the court observed
that the regulations prohibited DKT from having a contrary policy or to even
remain neutral to prostitution and sex trafficking.80 As the Policy Requirement
restricted grantees rather than the grant as in Rust, the court found that it could
not reconcile the two cases.81

74. Id. (explaining that FHI agreed to remit $60,000 of USAID grant funds to DKT for a
newly proposed condom-lubricant project, but retracted the grant after DKT refused to follow the
Policy Requirement).
75. Id. at 10; see also Memorandum of Law of Aids Action and Twenty-One Other
Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Summary Judgment at 12–22, DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 5 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 05-01604)
(“Gaining the trust and cooperation of sex workers . . . is a crucial component of the antiHIV/AIDS programs that are implemented around the world by amici.”).
76. DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d. at 6–7.
77. Id. at 10.
78. Id. at 13 (“[The USAID regulations] require the grantees, such as DKT, to adopt a
policy . . . thus precluding grantees from maintaining silence or neutrality, or adopting a policy
explicitly favoring the organization of prostitution. As such, they are view-point based funding
restrictions . . . .”).
79. Id. at 13, 16. Because the guidelines resulted in viewpoint discrimination, they were
subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 13–14. Under this stringent standard, the court held that the
Policy Requirement was not narrowly tailored to achieve the agency’s goal of “having a firm,
unilateral policy toward HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention.” Id. Viewpoint-based restrictions
on speech have become paradigmatic cases for this unforgiving standard of review. See, e.g.,
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991)
(requiring the state to show that a viewpoint-discriminating regulation is narrowly tailored to
serve the state’s compelling interest); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913
(1982) (describing the importance of First Amendment freedoms and the difficulty Congress
faces when defending restriction of such values).
80. See DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (explaining that DKT’s use of private funds was
restricted by the policy, which prohibited DKT from “taking any other position on the issue of
prostitution in any other context, even with wholly private funds”).
81. Id.
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ii. The D.C. Circuit Disapproves the District Court’s Analysis and
Upholds the Policy Requirement
The D.C. Circuit reversed the decision less than a year later, and noted that
the government not only may prefer certain viewpoints, but “often must” do so
when expounding its own message.82 Drawing on the rationales of Rust and
Valazquez, the court found that requiring organizations to explicitly oppose
prostitution was “‘the government’s own message . . . being delivered.’”83
Further, the court noted that the challenged provision did not compel recipients
to advocate a certain message; rather, it chose to fund only those programs that
shared the government’s message.84 Thus, the court held that this exercise of
the government’s Spending Clause power did not violate the First
Amendment.85 The court also rejected DKT’s contention that the regulations
unconstitutionally prevented recipients from using private funds to engage in
activity outside the program’s scope.86 As in Rust and Taxation with
Representation, the court noted that DKT could certify the policy by creating a
subsidiary, while remaining neutral itself.87
b. The Second Circuit Finds the Policy Requirement Unconstitutional
i. The Southern District of New York Grants a Preliminary Injunction
to NGOs
The Alliance for Open Society International (AOSI), Open Society Institute
(OSI), and Pathfinder International all run programs that combat HIV/AIDS
around the world.88 These NGOs accomplish this mission by providing
reproductive health assistance, family planning services, and combating
intravenous drug use.89 Most significantly, they provide education and
assistance to groups—such as prostitutes—at high risk of contracting
HIV/AIDS.90

82. DKT II, 477 F.3d 58, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
83. Id. at 762 (quoting Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001)).
84. Id. at 764.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 763.
87. Id. at 763 & n.4 (noting that the government stated during oral argument that DKT could
comply with the regulation by creating a subsidiary).
88. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 233 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d
Cir. Feb. 2, 2012); see also Public Health Program: HIV/AIDS, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND.,
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/hiv (last visited Jan. 13, 2012); What We Do:
HIV/AIDS, PATHFINDER INT’L, http://www.pathfind.org/site/PageServer?pagename=WhatWeDo
_AIDS (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
89. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 224.
90. Id. (noting that AOSI has directed part of its efforts to high-risk groups such as young
people, prostitutes, prisoners, and rural-urban migrant workers).
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In 2005, USAID issued a letter to AOSI indicating that “‘advocating for the
legalization of prostitution’ or ‘organizing or unionizing prostitutes for the
purpose of advocating for the legalization of prostitution’” was not compliant
with the Policy Requirement.91 AOSI and OSI filed a complaint against
USAID, which Pathfinder quickly joined based on its forced compliance with
the Policy Requirement.92 The plaintiffs subsequently added the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the United States Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as defendants.93 The NGOs claimed
that the Policy Requirement “compel[led] the organization[s] to engage in
speech against [their] own will,” and barred them from engaging in activities
such as “a thoughtful policy debate on the appropriate legal regime for
prostitution,” and participating in conferences designed to address sexual
health issues.94
In May 2006, District Judge Victor Marrero issued a preliminary injunction
preventing the agencies from enforcing the Policy Requirement against the
NGOs.95 Applying a heightened level of scrutiny,96 the district court found
that the Policy Requirement was not narrowly tailored to serve the
government’s goal because it created a “blanket ban on certain constitutionally
The district court also found that the policy
protected speech.”97
impermissibly restricted the NGOs from allocating private funds to support
other viewpoints.98 Lastly, the court held that the Policy Requirement, as
construed by the agencies, violated the First Amendment rights of AOSI and
91. AOSI I, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Letter from Christopher D.
Crowley, USAID Mission Director, to Galina Karmanova, AOSI (Oct. 7, 2005)), aff’d, 657 F.3d
218 (2d Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012).
92. Id. at 237–38.
93. Id. at 238.
94. Id. at 238–39.
95. Id. at 276. The NGOs also challenged the Agencies’ interpretation of the Policy
requirement, which they argued went beyond the statutory text. Id. at 239–40. In particular, they
argued that section 7631(f) only requires a general statement of declaration against prostitution,
and does not prohibit organizations from advocating for legalizing prostitution or assisting
organizations with such a viewpoint if no federal funds are used for such efforts. Id. at 240.
After a careful analysis of the purpose of the statute and the legislative history, the court rejected
this argument. Id. at 242–46.
96. Id. at 267 (adopting the test articulated in Rust, which asks “whether the restriction, as
interpreted and applied by Defendants, is ‘narrowly tailored to fit Congress’s intent’” (quoting
Rust v. United States, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991))).
97. Id. at 270. The agencies argued that the government has an interest in ensuring that “its
message (that the eradication of prostitution is part of its strategy to combat HIV/AIDS) [is not]
distorted by the activities of its private partners in this fight.” Id. at 268 (footnote omitted). The
court noted that the Policy Requirement’s explicit exemption of certain NGOs raised questions
about the agencies’ interest, but “decline[d] to dwell on this debate.” Id. at 268–69. Ultimately,
the court found that, even assuming the government had a significant interest, the Policy
Requirement as construed by the government was not narrowly tailored to fit that interest. Id. at
269–70.
98. Id. at 274.
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Pathfinder because it “improperly compels speech by affirmatively requiring
Plaintiffs to adopt a policy espousing the government’s preferred message.”99
ii. New Amendments to the AAPD Guidelines Result in Second Circuit
Remand
The government appealed to the Second Circuit and informed the court
during oral arguments “that HHS and USAID were developing guidelines that
would allow grantees to establish or work with separate affiliates that would
not be subject to the Policy Requirement.”100 HHS published its new
guidelines the following month.101 Although the guidelines still required
federally funded organizations to oppose prostitution explicitly, they expressly
permitted grantees to create a non-government-funded affiliate that would not
be subject to the Policy Requirement.102 The guidelines detailed ways grantees
could establish “adequate separation” from an affiliate in order to “maintain
program integrity,” including keeping all funds “physically and financially
separate from the affiliated organization.”103 After the new guidelines were

99. Id. The court found that OSI had not sufficiently demonstrated any likelihood that it
would succeed on its claim because it was not subject to the Policy Requirement. Id. at 277–78.
100. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 225–26 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv
(2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012).
101. Guidance Regarding Section 301(f) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 41,076 (July 26, 2007).
102. Id.; see also OFFICE OF ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTL’L DEV.,
AAPD 05-04 AMENDMENT 1, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST
HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE
OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 3 (2007) [hereinafter
AAPD 05-04 AMENDMENT 1], available at www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities
/cib/pdf/aapd05_04_amendment.pdf (“This guidance clarifies that an independent organization
affiliated with a recipient of Leadership Act funds need not have a policy explicitly opposing
prostitution and sex trafficking for the recipient to maintain compliance with the policy
requirement.”).
103. AAPD 05-04 AMENDMENT 1, supra note 102, at 2–4. The guidelines provide that:
A Recipient will be found to have objective integrity and independence from such an
organization if:
(1) The affiliated organization is a legally separate entity;
(2) The affiliated organization receives no transfer of Leadership Act funds, and
Leadership Act funds do not subsidize restricted activities; and
(3) The Recipient is physically and financially separate from the affiliated organization.
Mere bookkeeping separation of Leadership Act funds from other funds is not
sufficient.
Id. at 3–4. The guidelines list five relevant factors to determine if “such physical and financial
separation exists”:
(i) The existence of separate personnel, management, and governance;
(ii) The existence of separate accounts, accounting records, and timekeeping records;
(iii) The degree of separation from facilities, equipment and supplies used by the
affiliated organization to conduct restricted activities, and the extent of such restricted
activities by the affiliate;
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implemented, the Second Circuit summarily remanded the case to the district
court for reconsideration in light of the new guidelines, while leaving the
preliminary injunction intact pending review.104
iii. Second Review: Changed Guidelines, Same Result
On remand, the district court stood by its first decision and extended the
preliminary injunction to prevent the agencies from applying the Policy
Requirement to two more plaintiffs.105 The court noted that the alternative
provided by the new guidelines did not cure the original constitutional defect
as the NGOs were still required to adopt the government’s views publicly to
receive federal funding.106 The court also found that the new guidelines were
not narrowly tailored, in part because less-restrictive means to achieve the
government’s interests existed.107
Nearly three years after the start of litigation, the Second Circuit considered
the merits of the case.108 Divided two to one, the panel affirmed the district
court’s preliminary injunction after finding that the new USAID guidelines
were an unconstitutional condition on government funding.109 Applying
(iv) The extent to which signs and other forms of identification which distinguish the
Recipient from the affiliated organization are present, and signs and materials that
could be associated with the affiliated organization or restricted activities are absent;
and
(v) The extent to which USAID, the U.S. Government and the project name are
protected from public association with the affiliated organization and its restricted
activities in materials such as publications, conferences and press or public statements.
Id. at 4.
104. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (AOSI II), 254 F.
App’x 843, 846 (2d Cir. 2007).
105. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (AOSI III), 570 F.
Supp. 2d 533, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No.
08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012). The court granted the original plaintiffs’ motion to amend the
complaint to add InterAction, the largest humanitarian NGO alliance, and GHC, another large
alliance of international public health organizations. Id. at 538–45.
106. Id. at 545–46.
107. Id. at 549.
108. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir.
Feb. 2, 2012).
109. Id. at 234–40. On February 2, 2012, the Second Circuit denied the government’s
petition for en banc review. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l
Dev.(AOSI V), No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012). While the appeal was pending, USAID
and HHS again altered the guidelines to make them slightly less restrictive. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at
227. The new guidelines required that a grantee “affirmatively state in the funding document that
it is ‘opposed to the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking because of the psychological and
physical risks they pose for women, men, and children.” Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 89.1(b)
(2010)); see also OFFICE OF ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AAPD
05-04 AMENDMENT 3, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST
HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003, AS AMENDED—ELIGIBILITY
LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING
2 (2010) available at http://www.usaid.gov/business/business-opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd05_04_
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heightened scrutiny,110 the court found that the Policy Requirement was an
impermissible viewpoint-based restriction.111 The court rejected the agencies’
analogy to Rust’s government speech doctrine, noting that “[d]efendants
cannot now recast the Leadership Act’s global HIV/AIDS-prevention program
as an anti-prostitution messaging campaign.”112 Thus, the court found that the
Policy Requirement violated the First Amendment because it compelled
grantees to reiterate the government’s message as if it were its own to receive
federal funding.113
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S APPROACH SHEDS LIGHT ON INCONSISTENT
DOCTRINE
The disagreement between the Second and D.C. Circuits stems from the
unprecedented conditions articulated in the Leadership Act’s Policy
Requirement.114 Without clear guidance on when a federal spending condition
violates the First Amendment, courts have grappled with differentiating
between conduct- and viewpoint-based conditions, and understanding
government versus private speech.115 This Part argues that the Second Circuit
correctly applied existing Supreme Court jurisprudence when making this
determination.
A. The New USAID Guidelines Failed to Cure the Constitutional Defect
When the D.C. Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of the Policy
Requirement, the new USAID guidelines had not been implemented.116
Nonetheless, the court likened the case to Regan v. Taxation with
Representation and Rust v. Sullivan, and found that “[n]othing prevents DKT
from itself remaining neutral and setting up a subsidiary organization that
certifies it has a policy opposing prostitution.”117 In both Taxation with
Representation and Rust, the Supreme Court found that dual organizational

amendment3.pdf. The new guidelines also relaxed the separation requirement by eliminating the
requirement that affiliates have legal and managerial separation from grantees. Id. at 2, 7–8.
110. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 231 (defending a heightened-scrutiny test for the Spending Clause
enactment by noting that “Congress’s spending power, while broad, is not unlimited”).
111. Id. at 234–35 (reasoning that the Policy Requirement discriminated against viewpoints
in part because it “requires recipients to take the government’s side on a particular issue,” and that
“silence, or neutrality, is not an option for Plaintiffs”).
112. Id. at 237–38.
113. Id. at 239.
114. Id. at 257 n.4 (Straub, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority correctly noted that
“none of the [previous] unconstitutional conditions cases even involved an affirmative speech
condition”).
115. See supra note 10.
116. See supra note 87 and text accompanying notes 100–103.
117. DKT II, 477 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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structures avoided potential constitutional problems, because the projects—not
the recipients—were restricted.118
However, unlike Taxation with Representation and Rust, the Policy
Requirement does not merely deny a subsidy, it actually coerces speech.119 In
Taxation with Representation, creation of a § 501(c)(4) affiliate allowed the
government to restrict § 501(c)(3) organizations from lobbying.120 In Rust, the
possibility of separately funded programs allowed the federal government to
prohibit Title X recipients from providing abortion services with federal
money.121
The availability of an affiliate organization unbound by the Policy
Requirement, alternatively, still leaves in existence an additional imposition:
organizations receiving federal funds must also affirmatively oppose
prostitution.122 Creating a separate entity cannot alleviate this compulsion of
speech.123 The organization, not the program, is still burdened by its
requirement to serve as the government’s parrot by portraying the
government’s opinion as its own.124
B. The Government Speech Doctrine
The government speech doctrine, first used by the Supreme Court in Rust,125
allows the federal government to restrict speech as a condition to receiving
funds if it can show that the speech was “government speech.”126 As explained
by the Supreme Court in Velazquez, “viewpoint-based funding decisions can
be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker, . . . or
118. See supra Part I.B.1.
119. See AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 234.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
121. See supra text accompanying note 37.
122. If Congress were to implement only section 7631, which prohibits the use of federal
funds to promote the legalization of prostitution, the facts of this case would be comparable to
Rust and Taxation with Representation. See AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 237 (distinguishing Title X
from the Policy Requirement because Title X grantees “could remain ‘silen[t] with regard to
abortion,’ and, if asked . . . w[ere] ‘free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is simply
beyond the scope of the program.’ Here, on the other hand, Plaintiffs . . . must represent as their
own an opinion—that they affirmatively oppose prostitution—that they might not categorically
hold.” (citation omitted) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991))).
123. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010) (concluding that even though
the campaign-finance laws allowed corporations to create political action committees, it did not
remedy the First Amendment restrictions on the corporations themselves).
124. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 239.
125. Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 374 (2009); see
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 533–41 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did not place
explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have
explained Rust on this understanding.”).
126. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, at 1015 (noting that the First Amendment is inapplicable
when the speech at issue is governmental).
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instances . . . in which the government ‘used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its program.’”127 However, when speech is
private in nature, even though expressed with government funds,
viewpoint-based restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional.128 Thus, in
order to determine whether or not the Policy Requirement fits within the
government speech doctrine, it is imperative to determine not only whether the
speech was private, but also whether the restriction was viewpoint- or conductbased.
1. The Policy Requirement Is a Viewpoint-Based Restriction
The Policy Requirement clearly regulates viewpoints, rather than conduct.
If the government intended the requirement to prohibit certain conduct, it
would refuse to fund activities that promote legalizing prostitution.129 Instead,
the Policy Requirement affirmatively requires grantees to say something, and
discriminates against grantees that do not agree with the government’s
viewpoint.130 Thus, the Policy Requirement fits squarely within the purview of
viewpoint-based restrictions as it not only “muzzles grant recipients from
expressing any and all forbidden arguments,” but also further forces certain
viewpoints on them.131
2. Private Speech with Government Dollars
Given the lack of Supreme Court guidance, differentiating government
speech from private speech has proved challenging.132 In Rust, the Court
127. Velazquez, 533 U.S. at 541 (citation omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see Olree, supra note 125, at 367–68 (noting that the
government may convey its own viewpoint without commending an alternate viewpoint).
128. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“The University does acknowledge (as it must
in light of our precedents) that ideologically driven attempts to suppress a particular point of view
are presumptively unconstitutional in funding, as in other contexts . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
129. See supra note 24 (discussing the difference between the denial of a subsidy and an
impermissible condition or penalty).
130. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 237 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d
Cir. Feb. 2, 2012); DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
131. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corps., 164 F.3d 757, 772 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing a
different conditional-spending statute), aff’d, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
132. See Olree, supra note 125, at 378 (observing that, in distinguishing between private and
government speech, the Court’s approach has not been “unified and intentional”). Most courts
have found that speech is either government speech or private speech, but cannot be both. See id.
at 379. But see Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 671–72 (2008) (arguing that speech need not be purely
governmental or private).
In the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, appellate courts have crafted
their own approaches to determine when speech is governmental. For example, the Tenth Circuit
has developed a four-pronged test, which the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have
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found that the restrictions on speech—although conveyed through private
service providers—contributed to the government’s effort to promote its stance
on certain family planning methods, and therefore fell within the government
speech doctrine.133 In DKT, the D.C. Circuit followed this analysis when it
ruled that the Policy Requirement communicated the government’s message.134
In contrast, the Second Circuit followed the Velazquez Court.135 In Velazquez,
the Court emphasized that the attorneys received federal funding for the
purpose of representing their indigent clients, often in proceedings against the
government—a function that simply could not be construed as speaking for the
government.136
The Second Circuit asked the correct question: did Congress intend for the
Leadership Act to inform the international community that it opposes
prostitution?137 A review of the language and legislative history of the
Leadership Act reveals that the answer is no.138 The Leadership Act was
intended to fight HIV/AIDS, not serve as the government’s vehicle for
combating prostitution around the globe.139 In fact, the Policy Requirement
was implemented with little explanation of how it would affect the HIV/AIDS
epidemic.140 Only one of forty-one congressional findings of the Leadership
Act discussed eradicating prostitution,141 underscoring the fact that this was not
the central component of the Act.142 As the Second Circuit further noted, if the
government’s goal was ending prostitution, then the government would have
placed a blanket restriction on funding the World Health Organization (WHO),
since adopted, to determine whether something is government or private speech: “(1) whether the
central purpose of the governmental program facilitating the message is to promote private views;
(2) who exercises editorial control over the content of the message; (3) who is the literal speaker
of the message; and (4) who bears ultimate responsibility for the content of the message.” Olree,
supra note 125, at 386–95 (citing Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
133. Rust v. Sullivan, 531 U.S. 173, 178–79 (1991) (discussing the legislative history of Title
X); see Olree, supra note 125, at 375 (“The ‘family planning without abortion’ message was the
government’s own message, crafted in advance by the government, and the funds at issue were
part of a program designed to promote that kind of family planning rather than speech in general.”
(footnote omitted)).
134. DKT II, 477 F.3d at 761.
135. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 237–38.
136. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542–43.
137. See Olree, supra note 125, at 411 (positing that, for the speech to qualify as
governmental, the question, “did the government independently generate the idea of reaching an
audience with this particular message in this medium?” must be answered in the affirmative); see
also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005) (qualifying congressionally
mandated advertisements promoting beef as government speech, even though the speakers were
private entities).
138. See supra Part I.C.1.
139. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
141. See 22 U.S.C. § 7601(23) (2006).
142. See supra Part I.C.1.
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which has a policy advocating decreasing legal penalties for prostitutes as a
means of fighting HIV/AIDS.143 Instead, the Policy Requirement actually
exempts the WHO from the establishing a policy opposing prostitution.144
Opposition to the legalization of prostitution as a part of HIV/AIDS
treatment is not typical government speech because when the government
endorses a set message, that message usually plays a central part in, and
directly furthers the goals of its campaign or program.145 Instead, as the
legislative history reveals, the addition of the Policy Requirement was ancillary
to Congress’s goal to provide funding for HIV/AIDS efforts.146 As the Second
Circuit aptly noted, “[i]f the government-speech principle allowed Congress to
compel funding recipients to affirmatively espouse its viewpoint on every
subsidiary issue subsumed within a federal spending program, the exception
would swallow the rule.”147
III. THE ONLY AVAILABLE COMPROMISE: A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION
THAT WOULD SATISFY ALL
The U.S. Government and the NGOs battling the global HIV/AIDS
epidemic share the same goal: to eradicate HIV/AIDS through prevention and
treatment methods that also address the underlying causes of the illness.148
However, section 7631(f), as the government currently interprets it,
unconstitutionally hampers these efforts.149 The statute stifles NGOs’ speech
at great costs to certain HIV/AIDS victims, as “[g]aining the trust and
cooperation of sex workers is a crucial component of the anti-HIV/AIDS
programs,” and the Policy Requirement “threatens to alienate the communities
with which they work.”150 Similarly, as AOSI plaintiffs stated, requiring
NGOs to explicitly oppose prostitution negatively affects their “credibility and
integrity as NGOs, which generally avoid taking controversial policy positions
likely to offend host nations [and] partner organizations.”151 These concerns
143. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 238 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d
Cir. Feb. 2, 2012).
144. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f).
145. See Olree, supra note 125, at 413.
146. See Leadership Act Markup, supra note 55, at 149 (statement of Rep. Christopher
Smith, Vice Chairmain, H. Comm. on Int’l Relations).
147. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 238 (emphasis added).
148. See DKT II, 477 F.3d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing DKT’s efforts in HIV/AIDS
relief); supra note 56.
149. See supra Part II.A–B.
150. Amicus Brief on the Behalf of Aids Action and Twenty-Five Other Public Health
Organizations and Public Health Experts in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8–9, AOSI II, 254
F. App’x 843 (2d Cir. 2007( (No. 06-4035-cv).
151. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 236 (quoting Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 11–12, AOSI IV, 651
F.3d 218 (No. 08-4917-cv)). The assertion that the Policy Requirement would “offend host
nations” is an interesting concept with which to grapple, considering that the Policy Requirement
is not clear about the role NGOs may play in nations that legalize prostitution.
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have been realized in actuality. For example, Brazil, a country that has
involved the sex-worker population in its anti-AIDS initiative, chose not to
receive U.S. assistance for its AIDS efforts.152 Pedro Chequer, Brazil’s
national AIDS commissioner, explained that that they “could not conduct
effective outreach to and programs with sex workers if [their] NGO partners
were forced to state their explicit opposition to prostitution, as USAID was
requiring.”153
At minimum, Congress must amend section 7631(f) to pass constitutional
muster. This Part explores three alternative solutions that could survive
constitutional scrutiny while striking a balance between the goals of Congress
and nonprofit organizations, and discusses why only one of the solutions is
correct as a matter of policy.154
A. The Government’s Message Comes From Its Own Voice, but From
Another’s Mouth
One possible approach, and the most restrictive option, would allow the
federal government to continue restricting organizations’ speech, but would
alter the content of that speech. Under such a regulation, organizations would
be required to explicitly state that “the United States government opposes
prostitution,” but would not require grantees to declare that they themselves
oppose it.
This solution would allow Congress to ensure that its
anti-prostitution message was not “garbled” or “distorted,”155 but also ensure

152. Amicus Brief on Behalf of AIDS Action and Twenty-Five Other Public Health
Organizations, supra note 150, at 10-11.
153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Esther Kaplan, Just Say Não, NATION, May 12,
2005, http://www.thenation.com/article/just-say-não.
154. Although the alternatives suggested address actions that Congress must take, it might
also be possible for USAID, under the Chevron doctrine, to change their regulations in a manner
that conforms to the Constitution and meets policy objectives. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (stating that Congress gives
agencies the responsibility to promulgate regulations based on reasonable interpretations of
authorizing statutes). Chevron presents the administrative-law dilemma that occurs when various
administrations interpret statutes differently. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ET. AL., GELLHORN AND
BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1046, 1048–49 (10th ed. 2003). A
fascinating case study of such administrative-law issues can be found in the promulgation of Title
X. See id. at 1046–48. For example, in 1993, after President William Clinton took office, his
administration changed the HHS regulations that implemented Title X. Id. at 1048. Under the
new regulations, “Title X projects would be required, in the event of an unplanned pregnancy and
where the patient request such action, to provide nondirective counseling to the patient on options
relating to her pregnancy, including abortion . . . .” Standards of Compliance for AbortionRelated Services in Family Planning Service Projects, 58 Fed. Reg. 7462, 7462 (Feb. 5, 1993).
155. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 237 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
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that NGOs would not be compelled to become the “de facto mouthpieces”156
for the government’s opinion.
This solution would help ensure that partners and organizations of NGOs are
aware that the message about prostitution is not their own. However, it is
unclear whether requiring such a message would be constitutional.157 Further,
this solution would leave the concerns of many NGOs unaddressed. Vocal
disapproval of prostitution can ostracize the sex-worker population,158 and
force humanitarian organizations to agree that prostitution and human
trafficking are morally wrong and despicable practices that violate human
rights—a sentiment they may share, but have purposefully chosen not to state
publicly.159 It is common belief among the human-rights community that
“empowerment, organization, and unionization of sex workers can be an
effective HIV prevention strategy and can reduce the other harms associated
with sex work, including violence, police harassment, un-wanted pregnancy,
and the number of underage sex workers.”160 Continuing to vocalize public

156. AOSI I, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011),
reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012).
157. See Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459, 471 (D. Md. 2011)
(noting that a resolution requiring limited pregnancy centers—those that provide information to
pregnant women but have no physicians on staff—to post a waiting-room sign that states, among
other things, “the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be
pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider” was unlikely to withstand scrutiny); see
also Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(finding a likelihood of success on claims against a substantially identical provision aimed at
pregnancy centers).
158. Aziza Ahmed, Feminism, Power, and Sex Work in the Context of HIV/AIDS:
Consequences for Women’s Health, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 225, 235 (2011) (noting that
“coercive public measures” have “pushed sex workers underground” (footnote omitted)). See
generally Amicus Brief on Behalf of AIDS Action and Twenty-Five Other Public Health
Organizations, supra note 150 (discussing evidence of horrifying violence toward sex-workers by
law enforcement in developing countries and explaining how it affects access to HIV-related
services for sex-worker communities) .
159. See Nicole Franck Masenior & Chris Beyrer, The US Anti-Prostitution Pledge: First
Amendment Challenges and Public Health Priorities, 4 PLoS Med. 1158, 1159 (2007) (noting
that child prostitution and sex trafficking are universally opposed but that some entities may
differentiate between sex trafficking and sex work, and seek to empower rather than shame sex
workers).
160. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Alan Berkman et al., A Critical Analysis of the
Brazilian Response to HIV/AIDS: Lessons Learned for Controlling and Mitigating the Epidemic
in Developing Countries, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1162, 1168 (2005) (providing a case study of
Brazil’s successful efforts to reduce HIV/AIDS and noting that Brazil successfully sustained “a
consistent commitment to strengthen[] previously marginalized communities,” including the sexworker population); LORI BOLLINGER & JOHN STOVER, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS
INTERVENTIONS ON THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AFRICA: A SIMULATION EXERCISE FOR THE
WORLD BANK 21–22 (Mar. 3, 2007), available at http://sitesources.worldbank.org/INTHIV
AIDS/Resources/375798-1103037153392/ThePotentialImpactofHIV3March2007.pdf (noting that
“interventions targeting [sex workers] across all of sub-Saharan Africa are very cost-effective”
and have been shown to avert the number of infections).
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opposition to the activities of sex-workers, albeit on behalf of the government,
would still brand sex workers and lessen the effects of meaningful
humanitarian efforts.161
Additionally, to successfully carry out their humanitarian efforts, NGOs
must remain impartial and far removed from government ideology and
politics.162 Requiring NGOs to share the government’s message gives the
impression that the organizations are government agents.163 Because much of
the sex-worker population experiences violence from state actors, which may
cause them to distruct government, this solution would negatively affect NGOs
that wanted to work with and in the sex-worker community.164
B. Follow Rust Verbatim: Restrict Activities, Not Speech
Conversely, Congress could follow Rust and amend the statute by removing
the coerced-speech requirement altogether.
This would convert the
impermissible viewpoint-based restriction to a permissible conduct-based
restriction, under which Congress chooses to fund only certain activities.165
Under this scenario, Congress would discard section 7631(f) in its entirety and
rely primarily on section 7631(e), which provides that, “[n]o funds made
available to carry out this chapter . . . may be used to promote or advocate the
legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.”166 This approach
would be constitutional, as it is well established that the government may

161. As Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, poignantly stated, stopping
discrimination against vulnerable groups such as sex workers would lead to “fewer infections,
less demand for antiretroviral treatment, and fewer deaths. Not only is it unethical not to protect
these groups: it makes no sense from a public health perspective. It hurts all of us.” Ban Kimoon, Sec’y Gen. of the United Nations, Address to the International AIDS Conference (Aug. 3,
2008),
available
at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statements
_fall.asp?statID=297.
162. LARRY MINEAR, THE HUMANITARIAN ENTERPRISE: DILEMMAS AND DISCOVERIES
76–80 (2002) (“[T]he proposition that relief and rights groups should embrace political agendas
seems dangerous and diversionary.”). Many organizations find insulation from politics essential
in their efforts, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, which remains neutral on
political issues so as to focus on “matters of ‘charity’ rather than of ‘justice.’” Id. at 78.
The policy shift of the Bush administration’s HIV prevention efforts led to the “outright
disapproval” of many public-health professionals. J. Blake Scott, The Rhetoric of Science Versus
Politics in U.S. HIV Testing and Prevention Policy, in COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON
HIV/AIDS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 297, 309 (Timothy Edgar et al. eds., 2008). In 2003, Joe
McIlhany, president of a medical institute receiving federal funds and appointee to the CDC
director’s Advisory Committee, published an article titled AIDS a Disease, Not a Political Issue,
in which he criticized the use of politics in guiding public-health efforts. See id. at 309–10
(internal quotation marks omitted).
163. See MINEAR, supra note 162, at 115.
164. See Ahmed, supra note 158, at 252–56.
165. See supra Part I.B.1.
166. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2006).
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choose which activities to fund.167 It would also promote congressional efforts
to reduce prostitution, while recognizing the importance of neutrality by
international public-health organizations on policy matters.
If Congress were to amend the statute in this manner, USAID could require
regulated organizations to create two separate entities to manage their funds, as
HHS did in Rust.168 Although this approach would be constitutional, it would
still have devastating effects on public-health organizations by adding
enormous administrative costs to their already low budgets.169
C. Allow Organizations to Determine the Best Manner to Use and Regulate
Their Funds
As a matter of law and policy, the most reasonable alternative to the current
Policy Requirement is to continue to honor the government’s policy of denying
funds to efforts that promote or advocate the legalization of prostitution, but do
so in a manner that respects humanitarian organizations’ legitimate wish to
refrain from taking a political stance on an issue that affects a population they
serve. Although the Supreme Court in Rust held that agency regulations
requiring financial and physical separation are valid, such restrictions in the
context of public-health organizations are a budgetary nightmare.170 Thus,
Congress’s best alternative is to take this option one step further: eliminate the
physical separation requirement for funds.171
Under this approach, NGOs would still be required to use government funds
to finance only the conduct for which the funds were granted; however,
organizations would have the ability to create a structure through which they
167. See supra Part I.B.1–2. But see Sung Chang, Prostitutes + Condoms = AIDS?: The
Leadership Act, USAID, and the HHS Guidelines’ Failure to Define “Promoting Prostitution”, 19
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 385 (2011) (discussing how the definition of
“promoting” is ambiguous and unconstitutionally vague).
168. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
169. See Andrew Haber, Note, Rethinking the Legal Services Corporation’s Program
Integrity Rules, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 404, 436 (2010) (discussing how the LSC rules
requiring grantee organizations to create an affiliate for its non-federally funded activities
challenges the work of nonprofits “as resources remain scarce”); see also David S. Udell,
Implications of the Legal Services Struggle for Other Government Grants for Lawyering for the
Poor, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895, 919 (1998) (noting that requiring separate funds for LSCfunded organizations was so burdensome and unmanageable that only one such organization had
created an affiliate for that purpose by 1998).
170. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. It is clear that all government programs increase
management and bureuacratization of the public sector. LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN
PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 107
(1995) (“Government programs therefore often involve more red tape, cumbersome applications
requirements, and regulatory control than is common with other forms of financial support.”).
What is troublesome about requiring recipients to keep their federal funds “physically and
financially separate” from their private funds, is that it only further increases the bureaucratic
burden for the public sector. See 42 C.F.R. § 54.9 (2010).
171. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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could regulate their own funds. As a result, the heavy burden created by
requiring organizations to form two separate entities to manage their finances
would dissipate. The government would be satisfied knowing that its funds
were being used for permitted conduct only, and organizations would rejoice in
having the ability to dictate the management of their own budgets.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fractured Spending Clause jurisprudence provides little assistance to
courts in determining whether a government condition on the receipt of federal
funds is unconstitutional. The dissonant conclusions of the courts in DKT
International v. United States Agency for International Development and
Alliance for Open Society International v. United States Agency for
International Development highlight the inadequacies of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in this area. Both courts arrived at different conclusions on a
seemingly similar question: whether the Policy Requirement of the Leadership
Act, which requires organizations to explicitly oppose prostitution to receive
federal funds for HIV/AIDS programs, impermissibly violates the First
Amendment, and thus, qualifies as an unconstitutional condition. The D.C.
Circuit found that the Policy Requirement was not an unconstitutional
condition. The Second Circuit disagreed. A careful examination of the
legislative history of the Leadership Act demonstrates the strengths of the
Second Circuit’s holding. As the Supreme Court considers whether or not to
accept the case, it would be well advised to uphold the Second Circuit’s panel
decision. The best fix, however, would be a legislative one—satisfying both
Congress and NGOs, while honoring the Constitution and addressing policy
concerns.

866

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:839

